Antony Maxwell Ayrton | |
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![]() In the western desert, ca 1941
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Born | 1909 Hampstead |
Died | 1943 |
Nationality | English |
Occupation | Artist, Military engineer |
Tony Ayrton (born Antony Maxwell Ayrton, 1909 - 1943) was an artist and camouflage officer. He is best known for his work on the large-scale deception for the decisive second battle of El Alamein, Operation Bertram.
Ayrton was born in 1909 into an artistic family as the son of the architect Maxwell Ayrton. He became a painter.
He was gazetted as an officer in the Royal Engineers on 3 December 1939. He was responsible for forming No. 85 South African Camouflage Company, and in early 1941 he was one of only five fully trained camouflage officers in the whole of the British middle east. The Director of Camouflage for Middle East Command, Geoffrey Barkas, quickly had him seconded to his team, followed by the whole of No. 85 Camouflage Company. On 17 July 1942, Barkas made Ayrton his deputy, replacing the brilliant camoufleur Steven Sykes, who was exhausted and ill. Still short of camouflage officers, Barkas heard of a private soldier, Brian Robb, who was known to be skilful at drawing, and finding him enthusiastic and likeable, quickly brought him to General Headquarters in Cairo and had him promoted to Staff Lieutenant.
Charles Richardson was tasked by Freddie de Guingand, Bernard Montgomery's chief of staff, to plan the deception operation for El Alamein, named Operation Bertram. Richardson was happy to be able to rely on the "highly developed" system of camouflage and deception which Barkas had created. Richardson was a member of the Royal Engineers and had worked on deception operations in Dudley Clarke's secret 'A' Force. On 17 September 1941, Barkas and Ayrton were called to Eighth Army headquarters, out in the desert near Borg el Arab, between Alexandria and El Alamein. They listened in astonishment as Richardson explained the size of the deception that he was planning. He wanted Rommel to believe that Montgomery would attack in the south, not along the obvious coast road route; and that the attack would not be ready on the night of the full moon, 23 October. This was to be achieved despite the lack of cover in the desert, and the 700 tanks and 400 guns that were to be used in the attack.