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Toropets–Kholm Offensive

Toropets-Kholm Offensive
Part of the Battles of Rzhev
World War II Eastern Front during the 1942 Winter Counter-Offensive
World War II Eastern Front during the 1942 Winter Counter-Offensive
Date 9 January-6 February 1942
Location Northwestern Russia
Result Soviet victory
Belligerents
 Germany  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Nazi Germany Colonel General Ernst Busch Soviet Union General Pavel Kurochkin
Strength
Unknown 122,100
Casualties and losses
Soviet estimate:
12,000 overall
10,400 killed or missing
18,810 wounded
29,200 overall

The Toropets–Kholm Offensive was a military operation conducted south of Lake Ilmen by the Red Army during World War II, from 9 January-6 February 1942. The operation contributed to the formation of the Kholm Pocket and the encirclement of the Wehrmacht's II Army Corps in the Demyansk Pocket.

Following the successful Moscow counter-offensive of December 1941, the Stavka of the Red Army decided to conduct a broad-front offensive with the aim of destroying the invading German forces in the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht did not expect the Red Army to be capable of such a wide-ranging offensive, and therefore was caught off guard by attacks in areas that it supposed to be quiet, such as the region south of Lake Ilmen.

The Soviet North-Western Front—under General Pavel Kurochkin—was given two tasks to be executed from its position south of Lake Ilmen. The first was a western thrust through Staraya Russa, to split German 18th Army and 16th Army, and support the effort of Volkhov Front and Leningrad Front in breaking the siege of Leningrad. The second was a south-western thrust toward Vitebsk. This attack was to be conducted by three armies, 33rd, 3rd and 4th Shock, the latter two having just recently been renamed. Its ultimate aim was to become the northern pincer of a deep envelopment of German Army Group Center.

The initial penetration of the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies was very successful. German forces in the sector were overrun with heavy losses. The failure to predict this attack—coupled with multiple demands on the German reserves—gave the Soviet Front command an opening which it exploited to the utmost, driving deep into the German rear. While the Soviet forces had few supplies at the start of the offensive, they could keep going through the capture of significant amounts of German supply stores at Toropets.


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